bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
authorDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Wed, 24 May 2017 13:56:05 +0000 (14:56 +0100)
committerBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Wed, 15 May 2019 22:07:16 +0000 (23:07 +0100)
commitd3275d9b96d9b2bcb50fbf5c7011e7fc51cfc7f2
treecbf98d7af6e1d00a9e9360f4354d44d7597ae2b7
parent248308fbeea904692e91404e3a37b0f09d9279f6
bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down

There are some bpf functions can be used to read kernel memory:
bpf_probe_read, bpf_probe_write_user and bpf_trace_printk.  These allow
private keys in kernel memory (e.g. the hibernation image signing key) to
be read by an eBPF program and kernel memory to be altered without
restriction.

Completely prohibit the use of BPF when the kernel is locked down.

Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
cc: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>
cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
[bwh: Adjust context to apply after commit dcab51f19b29
 "bpf: Expose check_uarg_tail_zero()"]

Gbp-Pq: Topic features/all/lockdown
Gbp-Pq: Name 0027-bpf-Restrict-kernel-image-access-functions-when-the-.patch
kernel/bpf/syscall.c